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ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATION THROUGH 
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS AND 
CREATIVE NEGOTIATION: RENEWED COMMUNITY 
INVOLVEMENT IN FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT 
Jeff Ganguly* 
Traditionally, federal environmental enforcement actions have had two 
goals-mandatory compliance with statutory standards, and punitive 
monetary penalties to deter future violations. Protracted litigation has 
generally been the tool used to achieve these goals, requiring substan-
tial time and money. However, such "end-of-the-pipe" regulations have 
failed to address issues of pollution prevention and remediation in the 
areas harmed by environmental violations. This comment argues that a 
more effective means of federal enforcement can be achieved through 
the use of creative settlement techniques that employ supplemental 
environmental projects to address pollution prevention and community 
remediation. These projects allow enforcement agencies to go beyond 
the limitations of traditional enforcement methods by keeping penalty 
dollars local to benefit the communities harmed by environmental vio-
lations, while still holding accountable the violating parties. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 1, 1993, Region I of the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)1 received an anonymous tip concerning suspicious-looking bar-
rels outside the garage of a Massachusetts Highway Department 
(MHD) facility on Route 24 in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.2 An initial 
* Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1998-1999. 
I would like to thank Deborah Brown for the wealth of time and information she provided that 
was instrumental in researching this comment. 
1 The Region I office is located in Boston, Massachusetts at the John F. Kennedy Federal 
BUilding. 
2 See Scott Allen, State, EPA Agree on $20m Waste Cleanup, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 11, 1994, 
Metro/Region at 1. 
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EPA investigation yielded discovery of roughly seventy-five barrels 
of waste, some uncovered, some over a year old.3 Subsequent inves-
tigations of several other of the 148 MHD facilities would reveal over 
one hundred more illegally stored barrels of hazardous waste.4 While 
these discoveries set the stage for years of protracted litigation be-
tween EPA and MHD under the rubric of either a Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CER-
CLA) or Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) federal 
enforcement action, remarkably a settlement was reached in just over 
a year.5 Most notable, though, were the terms of the settlement, which 
resulted in over $20 million in cleanup costs to remediate the state 
facilities.6 Additionally, $5 million would be spent on supplemental 
environmental projects (SEPs) focusing on environmental justice pro-
grams to benefit the communities that were harmed by MHD.7 All of 
this money was to be spent within Massachusetts, principally in low-
income areas that were most affected by environmental pollution.8 
Only a small penalty of $100,000 was to be paid directly to the federal 
government by the state.9 
While the settlement was the largest ever against a state agency 
under RCRA, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was able to turn 
a potentially devastating, high-profile enforcement action into a win-
win situation for both the state and EPA, with only the federal treas-
ury losing out.10 Millions of potential penalty dollars were internalized 
by the state to directly benefit it from the enforcement action, with 
much of the remediation work beginning within a year of the initial 
in vestigation. ll 
Such a success story historically would have been rare in environ-
mental enforcement, but environmental attorneys have learned from 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 See generally In the Matter of: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Massachusetts High-
way Department, EPA Docket No. RCRA-I-94-1071, Consent Agreement and Order, Oct. 3, 
1994, p.6 [hereinafter MHD Consent Agreement]; Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1994); The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), §§ 101-405,42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
6 See Allen, supra note 2. 
7 See id.; EPA, DEP, and Mass Highway Reach Unprecedented Environmental Enforcement 
Agreement, EPA ENvTL. NEWS, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1 [hereinafter EPA ENVTL. NEWS]. 
8 See Allen, supra note 2. 
9 See MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 42. 
10 See EPA ENvTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1; see also Allen, supra note 2. 
11 See Allen, supra note 2. 
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the first generation of federal enforcement that developed primarily 
in the 1970s and 1980s.12 Protracted litigation results in millions of 
lost dollars, with years going by before polluted sites are eventually 
cleaned.13 Frequently, detrimental impacts on communities adjacent 
to such sites are not even addressed, particularly in low-income com-
munities.14 
This Comment will attempt to explore the new generation of fed-
eral enforcement that has developed through the use of SEPs and 
creative lawyering to more effectively address the needs of commu-
nities affected by environmental pollution, using the MHD settlement 
as the prototype. Section I explores RCRA, the federal statute that 
set the framework for EPA enforcement action and allowed the set-
tlement and on-site remediation to take place. Section II lays out the 
background and procedural aspects of the EPA investigation under 
RCRA, detailing the nature of the investigation and subsequent ne-
gotiations as they played out. Section III analyzes both the history 
and significance of SEPs, which were the key to the community re-
mediation. Section IV details both the unique SEPs that were em-
ployed by the EPA in this case and the continuing development of 
the SEP program. The concluding section argues that the procedural 
methodology and substantive results from the MHD settlement 
should represent the prototype for the new generation of environ-
mental enforcement, using dispute resolution, creative settlement 
techniques, and community input to quickly and effectively remediate 
and restore communities affected by environmental pollution beyond 
the scope of what a traditionally adjudicated statutory enforcement 
action could achieve. 
12 See generally J. William Futrell, Hazardous Wastes and Toxic Substances: Lessons from 
Superfund, RCRA, and Other Environmental Laws, 24 Hous. L. REV. 125 (1987). 
13 See Terry J. Satterlee & Jerry L. Anderson, RCRA Corrective Action: The Next Wave of 
Hazardous Substance Cleanup, 59 UMKC L. REV. 181, 181-82 (1991); Peter J. Howe, New 
Bedford Still Seeks Way to Deal With PCBs, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 3,1997, at B1 (New Bedford 
Harbor named a Superfund site over 14 years ago, but as of Nov. 1997, only approximately three 
percent of hazardous PCB waste had been cleaned). 
14 See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environ-
mental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. 
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1. RCRA-THE HISTORY OF A FEDERAL REGULATORY PROGRAM 
A. The Development of RCRA 
RCRA is the major federal statute that regulates solid and hazard-
ous waste. IS RCRA was actually an amendment to the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act of 1965 (SWDA), which was first amended in 1970 under 
the Resource Recovery Act (RRA).16 RCRA so transformed SWDA 
that it is now referred to merely as RCRA.17 
SWDA grew out of an amendment to the Clean Air Act aimed at 
addressing the growing contamination and pollution of the environ-
ment from industrialization and urbanization.18 The purpose ofSWDA 
was both to initiate a national research and development program for 
the proper and economical disposal of solid waste, and to provide 
technical and financial assistance to state and local governments to 
plan, develop, and conduct solid waste disposal programs. 19 However, 
by 1970, Congress became alarmed by the amount of solid waste being 
generated by the country, and amended SWDA under the Resource 
Recovery Act of 1970.20 RRA shifted focus from disposal to manage-
ment and recovery of reusable materials and energy.21 Like SWDA, 
RRA mainly provided grants and funding for developing proj ects and 
facilities without requiring a formal regUlatory program addressing 
solid waste disposal.22 By the time Congress returned to the issue of 
solid waste six years later, a new crisis had developed with non-resi-
dential waste, or hazardous waste.23 
President Ford signed RCRA into law in 1976 to confront hazard-
ous waste, one of the nation's highest-priority environmental prob-
lems.24 RCRA, the first significant federal effort to address hazardous 
15 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-699ICk) (1994). 
16 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 251 (1992); SWDA Pub. L. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992 [hereinafter SWDA); RRA Pub. 
L. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 [hereinafter CCA). 
17 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 16, at 251. 
18 See John C. Chambers & Mary S. McCullough, From the Cradle to the Grave: an historical 
perspective of RCRA, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 21; Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994). 
19 See id. (quoting SWDA § 202(b». 
20 See id. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 21. 
24 See id. at 22. 
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waste,25 regulated the treatment, storage, and management disposal 
of hazardous wastes by monitoring wastes from their creation until 
after their permanent disposal.26 Hence, RCRA is often referred to as 
a "cradle-to-grave" regulation because it regulates the entire waste 
cycle with "an exceptional degree of rigor and detail."27 
A key provision of RCRA is the definition of solid waste itself, 
which allows for the potential regulation of almost any discarded 
substance, regardless of physical form or property.28 Thus, the 1976 
RCRA amendments were able to achieve, at least on paper, what the 
preceding efforts of SWDA and RRA had not: a national solid waste 
policy and regulatory program mandating that hazardous wastes be 
treated, stored, and disposed of in a manner that would minimize the 
present and future threat to human health and the environment.29 
RCRA completely overhauled the previous SWDA by comprehen-
sively regulating the handling of solid and hazardous wastes at cur-
rently-operating or future waste disposal facilities.30 Waste shipments 
were subject to a tracking system, the so-called "cradle-to-grave" 
manifest system, and three separate groups-hazardous waste gen-
erators; transporters; and treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) fa-
cilities-had to comply with standards to ensure environmentally 
sound disposal of waste materials.3! This regulatory program has been 
viewed as the most comprehensive regulatory program ever devel-
oped by EPA.32 However, implementation of the regulatory scheme 
took nearly four years, and by then an unforeseen problem had al-
ready arisen regarding inactive waste sites.33 
RCRA's regulatory scheme essentially takes a two-prong approach 
to hazardous waste by setting strict standards for the storage, trans-
25 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 183. 
26 See Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 505-06 
(1986) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982)). 
27 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 16, at 251-52; see also Chambers & McCullough, supra note 
18, at 22. 
28 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 22. Section 1004(27) of RCRA defines solid 
waste as any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment 
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, 
semisolid, or contained gaseous material reSUlting from industrial, commercial, mining, and 
agricultural operation .... [d.; 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1982). 
29 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 22. 
30 See Futrell, supra note 12, at 125 n.3. 
31 See id. A major goal of RCRA was to protect and preserve the quality of groundwater, a 
resource increasingly relied on as drinking water in the U.S. See id. 
32 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 22. 
33 See id. 
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portation, and disposal or treatment of hazardous waste, and then by 
employing the comprehensive manifest system to effectively track 
waste though all of its phases.34 However, such an approach essentially 
focused on the prevention of future hazardous waste, and enforcement 
under the 1976 Act soon ran into problems attempting to address past 
or inactive waste storage and disposal sites.35 One such problem was 
EPA's attempt to use section 7003 of RCRA to require cleanup of 
hazardous waste releases.36 Section 7003 gave EPA the authority to 
restrain practices presenting an "imminent and substantial endanger-
ment to health or the environment."37 However, courts generally did 
not construe the language of section 7003 to provide for remedial 
action from past disposal practices, and RCRA contained no other 
corrective action provisions.38 
In 1980, both CERCLA and the first series of amendments to 
RCRA were passed.39 The enactment of CERCLA addressed the 
problem of cleaning up hazardous waste releases and responded to 
the gaps left by RCRA section 7003 by providing for the cleanup 
of inactive sites.40 In fact, CERCLA was primarily directed toward 
abandoned or inactive sites,4l However, the release of hazardous sub-
stances at operating facilities was still inadequately addressed under 
RCRA.42 Part of the problem was EPA's inability to meet its statutory 
deadlines for promUlgating regulations under RCRA, which led to a 
lack of enforcement.43 In fact, the early 1980s have been referred to 
as the most abrasive chapter in the history of relations between EPA 
and Congress, as the hazardous waste issue essentially became a 
captive of politics.44 
34 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 183. 
35 See id. 
36 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6973. 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 6973; Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 183. 
38 See id. See generally United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 788-92 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
39 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675; Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 23. 
40 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 184. 
41 See id. 
42 See id. 
43 See Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 22-23; PLATER ET AL., supra note 16, at 
929. 
44 See Futrell, supra note 12, at 134. 
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B. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments 
In response to the EPA's inability to effectively promulgate regu-
lations to enforce RCRA, Congress passed the Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA).45 These amendments, lengthy 
and unparalleled in detail, intruding into EPA's management prac-
tices, and prescribing new regulatory practices, have been touted as 
a classic example of intergovernmental distrust.46 The amendments 
also increased the overall complexity of the RCRA regime to earn it 
the characterization by one judge as a statute of "mind-numbing" 
complexity.47 
HSWA contained an unprecedented number of statutory deadlines 
for mandatory duties to be performed by the EPA.48 Congress en-
sured EPA compliance by inserting a number of "hammer" provisions 
subjecting EPA to harsh legislative standards set by Congress if EPA 
failed to act.49 Additionally, citizens would be able to sue EPA to force 
compliance in the event EPA missed an implementation deadline.50 
Substantively, HSWA filled the gap between RCRA and CERCLA 
by requiring corrective action at any facility permitted under 
RCRA.51 Although the corrective action provisions mandated by Con-
gress took several years to implement, the end result allowed EPA 
to require the owner or operator of a solid waste management facility 
to respond to releases of hazardous constituents. 52 
Hence, as CERCLA cases became more and more bogged down in 
protracted studies and intractable litigation, commentators predicted 
that EPA would place increasing emphasis on the corrective action 
mechanisms provided by RCRA (and HSWA).53 Although it limited 
45 See id.; PLATER ET AL., supra note 16, at 929; Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 
23. 
46 See Futrell, supra note 12, at 134. Futrell continues that in the "ensuing bureaucratic 
collapse with its resignations and dismissals, the EPA lost its chance to develop a hazardous 
waste program in which it could use its discretion to assess and manage risks." [d.; see also 
Chambers & McCullough, supra note 18, at 23 (The 1984 amendments not only significantly 
expanded the regulatory program under RCRA, but also limited the discretion previously given 
to EPA to administer the program.). 
47 See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also 
Randoph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Com-
plicated Environmental Statute, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10255, 10256 (May 1991). 
48 See Futrell, supra note 12, at 134. 
49 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 16, at 929 n.ll. 
50 See Futrell, supra note 12, at 134. 
51 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 184. 
52 See id. 
53 See id. at 181. 
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EPA's discretion in promulgating the program, the corrective action 
approach was to be more streamlined than CERCLA in order to give 
the agency more flexibility in dealing with different hazardous waste 
clean-up situations.54 
Thus, while section 7003 of RCRA is still one of the most significant 
provisions for triggering the statute, the corrective action provisions 
provide for broader cleanup authority than what EPA relied upon 
prior to 1984.55 
C. RCRA's Corrective Action Program 
Although HSWA mandated development of the corrective action 
program, the overwhelming complexities involved prevented EPA 
from issuing the proposed regulations for almost six years. 56 The new 
corrective action measures focused on cleanup of RCRA-regulated 
sites even for conditions that were created in the past.57 EPA was 
directed to promulgate regulations requiring "corrective action for all 
releases of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste 
management unit . . . regardless of the time at which waste was 
placed in such unit."58 Thus, RCRA TSD facilities subject to the above 
provision are in effect subject to the same degree of examination and 
potential clean-up activities as a CERCLA site.59 
According to section 6925 of RCRA, any owner or operator of a 
facility that engages in treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous 
waste is required to obtain a RCRA Subtitle C permit. 60 Accordingly, 
this provision automatically subjects the facility to the corrective 
action provisions implemented under HSWA, even if the facility will 
only store hazardous waste.61 Thus, the threshold issues in a RCRA 
action are often whether a substance is in fact a hazardous waste, and 
54 See id. 
55 See id. at 183 (unlike CERCLA and the corrective action provisions, § 7003 does not provide 
broad cleanup authority). 
56 See Richard G. Stoll, The New RCRA Cleanup Regime: Comparisons and Contrasts with 
CERCLA, 44 Sw. L.J. 1299, 1304 (1991). 
67 See id. at 1300. 
58 42 V.S.C. § 6924(u). 
59 See Stoll, supra note 56, at 1305. Facilities that merely generate waste and stay within a 
ninety day accumulation exemption (transferring waste off site within that period) will not 
trigger T/SID interim status and are exempt from the corrective action program. See id. at 1306; 
40 C.F.R. § 262.34 (1990). 
60 See 42 V.S.C. § 6925. 
61 See id.; Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 184; Stoll, supra note 56, at 1305. 
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moreover, whether an activity qualifies as treatment, storage, or dis-
posa1.62 
Section 3004 of RCRA contains many of the HSWA provisions in-
corporating corrective action, as well as minimum technology, ground 
water monitoring, labeling, and record-keeping requirements (the 
baseline requirements).63 Section 3004(u) of RCRA requires any per-
mitted facility or facility seeking a permit to take corrective action 
for all releases of hazardous waste, and section 3004(v) requires that 
corrective action be taken beyond the facility boundaries where nec-
essary to protect human health and the environment.64 
Failure to comply with these provisions or to take corrective ac-
tions from EPA compliance orders can result in fines of up to $25,000 
per day, per violation.65 Thus, EPA may order corrective actions at 
any permitted facilities where there has been a release of hazardous 
waste or constituents of solid waste, with failure of compliance result-
ing in fairly stiff penalties.66 
Although "release" is not defined under RCRA, it is generally 
interpreted along the lines of the CERCLA definition, which includes 
not only leaking and spilling, but even the dumping of closed barrels 
in some instances.67 
Thus, the RCRA corrective action program has been deemed 
"CERCLA-like" in scope and effect.68 A look at the corrective action 
procedures will show a process that is very similar to a CERCLA 
investigation, while also highlighting some of the distinctions between 
the programs. 69 
62 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 184; Stoll, supra note 56, at 1305; see also 
PLATER ET AL., supra note 16, at 929. Under the mature corrective action program, a facility 
must address ha2ardous constituent releases if they come from units containing any solid waste, 
regardless of whether the waste is legally classified as ha2ardous. 
63 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(0), (p), (r), (s); Interview with Deborah Brown, Head of RCRA 
Enforcement Group, EPA Region I, Feb. 8, 1998 [hereinafter Brown Interview 2/8/98]. The 
baseline program actually becomes the most significant set of provisions in the Mass. Highways 
dispute. See infra notes 126-33 and accompanying text. 
64 See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u), (v). 
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (c). 
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928; Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 187. 
67 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 187. This would in fact be the case in MHD, as 
storing closed barrels can violate the baseline program in several different capacities without 
technically even having a release. See In the Matter of: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
Massachusetts Highway Department, EPA Docket No. RCRA-I-94-1071 at 10-12 [hereinafter 
MHD Complalnt]. 
68 See Stoll, supra note 56, at 1299. 
69 See generally Stoll, supra note 56. 
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D. A CERCLAJRCRA Comparison 
EPA essentially followed the procedural structure of a CERCLA 
cleanup for the RCRA corrective action procedures, while attempting 
to include more flexibility and efficiency.7o A CERCLA cleanup in-
volves a preliminary investigation, a remedial investigation and fea-
sibility study, the issuance of a record of decision, and the remedial 
action.71 The length of time between the preliminary investigation and 
the record of decision can be as long as eight years.72 By the time EPA 
issues the record of decision, the cleanup has frequently only con-
sisted of preliminary short-term removal measures to mitigate dam-
ages-full remediation can take as long as three or more years.73 
EPA thus attempted to streamline the RCRA corrective action 
program.74 The agency first performs a RCRA Facility Assessment 
(RFA), which includes a paperwork review and site visit.75 If further 
action is necessary, a RCRA Facility Investigation (RFI) is per-
formed, and, if required, a Corrective Measures Study (CMS) is un-
dertaken to assess remedial alternatives and costS.76 The CMS will 
then serve as the basis for corrective action measures.77 
Although EPA structured the procedural format of a RCRA cor-
rective action similar to CERCLA, EPA also attempted to make 
RCRA cleanups more flexible and less cumbersome than CERCLA 
through less complex studies and less costly remedies.78 One key 
difference between CERCLA and RCRA is that RCRA typically 
involves only one site owner or operator, and less time and transaction 
costs need to be consumed impleading potentially responsible par-
ties.79 Additionally, choices of remedies under RCRA are generally 
more flexible than CERCLA because there is no National Contin-
gency Plan to follow. so Thus, when implementing the corrective action 
70 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 187. 
71 See id. 
72 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 16, at 885. 
73 See id. In 1989 the average time period for a CERCLA cleanup was roughly 12 years. See 
id. It is against such a back drop that dispute resolution and fast action remediation take on 
paramount importance. 
74 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 181. 
75 See Stoll, supra note 56, at 1309. 
76 See id.; Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 187. 
77 See Stoll, supra note 56, at 1310; Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 193. 
78 See Stoll, supra note 56, at 1311; Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 195. 
79 See Satterlee & Anderson, supra note 13, at 195. 
80 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1995). The National Contingency Plan specifies proce-
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measures, EPA expresses a general preference for deferring to 
RCRA where a viable owner or operator is on site, although no 
statutory provision prevents the use ofCERCLA.81 In fact, the EPA's 
position grants it wide discretion in picking and choosing between the 
two statutes.82 Such a position creates a lot of bargaining leverage for 
EPA, and this statutory dynamic should be kept in mind to under-
stand the development and negotiation process of the Mass Highway 
Department case. 
II. REGULATION IN ACTION: THE MHD CASE 
A. Investigation 
Region I of the EPA has jurisdiction throughout New England, 
which includes Connecticut, Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Massachusetts. On April 1, 1993, an anonymous caller 
informed the EPA that there was a large cluster of drums that ap-
peared to contain hazardous waste located at a maintenance facility 
owned by the MHD in Bridgewater, Massachusetts.83 The initial in-
vestigation by an EPA inspector immediately raised concerns when 
unlabeled barrels, corroded drums, and stained soil were found at the 
site.84 The inspector contacted the MHD site facilitator, who seemed 
ignorant of the federal waste handling laws, but assured the EPA 
inspector that they had performed an environmental audit and were 
handling the situation.85 However, the facilitator would only turn over 
bits and pieces of the audit to the inspector.86 This further raised the 
suspicions of the inspector, as the audit encompassed not only the 
Bridgewater site, but a11148 MHD facilities.87 Through the enforce-
dures, techniques, materials, equipment, and methods to be employed in identifying, removing, 
and remediating releases of hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). This difference 
between CERCLA and RCRA would become very significant in negotiating the MHD settle-
ment because it allowed EPA the flexibility to tailor the settlement to maximize the speed and 
scope of remediation efforts without having to go through as many time consuming procedural 
hoops as otherwise might be required. See Brown Interview 218/98, supra note 63. 
81 See Stoll, supra note 56, at 1312. 
82 See id. 
83 See MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 6. 
84 See Interview with Deborah Brown, Dec. 3, 1997 [hereinafter Brown Interview 1213/97]; see 
also MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 6. 
85 See Allen, supra note 2; see also Brown Interview 1213197, supra note 84. 
88 See Brown Interview 1213/97, supra note 84. 
87 See id. 
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ment of RCRA, EPA was eventually able to compel disclosure of the 
audit.88 
Section 3007 of RCRA is an efficient information-gathering enforce-
ment tool, allowing EPA to enter sites for inspection and sampling, 
gain access to records and copy them, and make formal written de-
mands for information regarding an entity's hazardous waste activ-
ity.89 
Thus, further investigation of the audit received at Bridgewater led 
EPA to other MHD sites, and inspections continued to take place for 
the better part of the next year.90 
The series of inspections took a full year before EPA was able 
to take significant legal action.91 During that time, EPA tried to as-
certain whether there was either a systemic problem within MHD, or 
whether there were just a few isolated incidents of possible contami-
nation.92 The South Boston facility was one of the last facilities inves-
tigated, and with thirty to forty violations at that facility alone, it was 
clear that these were not isolated incidents.93 
B. Negotiation 
After investigations of several other sites revealed dozens of viola-
tions, Deborah Brown, the head of Region I's RCRA Division, went 
to MHD's General Counsel and said, "You guys have got a real prob-
lem."94 
This, in and of itself, is not the typical procedure for EPA.95 EPA 
seldom notifies a party of a pending enforcement action (until the 
party receives the administrative complaint in the mail) unless there 
is an imminent and substantial threat to human health and the envi-
88 See id.; see also STEPHEN FERRY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 278 (1997). 
89 See 42 U.S.C. § 6927. 
90 See MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 6-8; EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 
4 (MHD audits revealed storage and disposal problems at numerous sites). The audit would 
eventually be fully disclosed. It was conducted by an environmental consulting group and 
basically listed in spreadsheet format all of the MHD facilities with potential problems and 
findings/or each/acility. See Brown Interview 1213197, supra note 84. 
91 See MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 6-8; Brown Interview 218/98, supra note 
63. 
92 See MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 6-8; Brown Interview 218/98, supra note 
63. 
93 See MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 7; see also Allen, supra note 2; MHD 
Complaint, supra note 84, at 11-12. 
94 See Brown Interview 1213/97, supra note 84; Allen, supra note 2. 
95 See Brown Interview 1213197, supra note 84. 
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ronment.96 However, that decision, and the decision by the MHD 
General Counsel to deal immediately with the problem, allowed for 
negotiations to take place and a settlement to be reached prior to the 
issuance of a complaint or enforcement action.97 This was also highly 
unusual, since the complaint itself is frequently the leverage piece for 
EPA in negotiations.98 
However, in this case, EPA had already documented dozens of vio-
lations at at least three sites.99 The RCRA penalty provisions provide 
for fines of up to $25,000 per violation per day.lOo Most of the violations 
from the initial inspections were merely baseline violations, such as 
failure to label and failure to keep records.101 Some of the facilities 
were not even permitted.102 The baseline penalties alone were already 
into the millions of dollars, and EPA had yet even to address the more 
complicated issues of corrective action provisions and whether some 
sites had gone beyond generator status to qualify as default interim 
TSD facilities.103 
These more complex issues would have been costly to litigate, not 
only to MHD, but also to EPA and federal enforcement agencies. For 
example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) would have to be involved 
to litigate the issues beyond mere compliance with the baseline pro-
gram.104 Such involvement substantially increases the length of time 
of the litigation, potentially by years, which in turn significantly in-
creases costS.I05 In turn, this would have delayed much of the cleanup 
and remediation efforts by years as well, because such efforts would 
have had to come within strict compliance with an approved correc-
tive action program as delineated by DOJ and EPA.lo6 Initiation ofthe 
corrective action program requires formally completing all of the 
96 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6973. 
97 See generally MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5; MHD Complaint, supra note 84; see 
also EPA ENvTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1-3. 
98 See Brown Interview 12/3/97, supra note 84. 
99 See id.; see also EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 4 (although the complaint focused on 
just three of the department's 148 facilities, MHD audits revealed storage and disposal problems 
at numerous sights). 
100 See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), (c). 
101 See MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 6--8. See generally MHD Complaint, supra 
note 84. 
102 See Brown Interview 2/8/98, supra note 63. 
103 See MHD Complaint, supra note 84, at 18-19. 
104 See Brown Interview 2/8/98, supra note 63. 
105 See id. 
106 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text. 
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procedures outlined in Section I of this comment, including full RFls 
by the DOJ to follow up EPA's initial RFAs, a corrective measures 
study, and then the issuance of corrective action measures for each 
site.107 While RCRA's corrective action program was designed to be 
more streamlined than CERCLA's, industry analysts now recognize 
that the cumbersome and expensive administrative and procedural 
requirements of the program can actually be an impediment to effi-
cient clean-up and remediation efforts, resulting in EPA's actual 
avoidance of its use. lOB 
Thus, the cost of litigation throughout this entire process appears 
to have been in and of itself a substantial impetus to negotiate a 
settlement for both sides. MHD knew it was going to be spending 
millions of dollars one way or another merely to come into compli-
ance.109 Any significant delay would mean more money, not only in 
litigation costs, but in remediation and penalty costs.110 MHD would 
also feel significant public and political pressure to act swiftly once 
the nature of the violations became public. 111 
Additionally, looming behind the baseline compliance issues was 
section 7003 of RCRA.112 At MHD sites with more egregious viola-
tions, such as Bridgewater and South Boston, EPA could likely have 
compelled immediate action under its authority to restrain practices 
presenting an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or 
the environment, although they never would have been able to compel 
what was agreed to under the SEP provisions.113 However, the com-
plexity of litigation would have again dramatically increased even 
under section 7003, as the legal theories involved moved from the 
almost strict liability standards of failure to comply under the baseline 
program, to proving whether the threatened damage from ongoing 
activity at MHD sites constituted imminent and substantial danger,114 
107 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
108 See generally 28 Env't Rep. (BN A) 8-15 (Jan. 16, 1998) (RCRA reform sought to streamline 
and improve efficiency of corrective action program ... that is used reluctantly by industry 
because of what parties from all sides see as cumbersome administrative requirements); 28 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1343 (Nov. 7, 1997) (costly and timely RCRA requirements under corrective 
action encourage some owners to abandon sites rather than face RCRA requirements); 26 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1898 (Feb. 2, 1996) (RCRA reform sought to increase efficiency and flexibility). 
109 See MHD Complaint, supra note 84, at 18-19. 
110 See supra note 100 ($25,000 per day per violation). 
111 See EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1-2 (both the EPA and the Commonwealth held 
a common belief that public agencies had an equal if not greater obligation than businesses to 
comply with environmental laws). 
112 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
113 See id. 
114 See FERRY, supra note 88, at 285. 
1998] SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL PROJECTS 203 
Faced with the prospects of being targeted by DOJ, EPA, and 
eventually the state attorney general's office and state Department 
of Environmental Protection (DEP), MHD decided to take immediate 
action to work with EPA toward negotiating a settlement and achiev-
ing compliance.1l5 Immediate action would mitigate the cost of future 
clean-up expenses by preventing hazardous constituents from work-
ing themselves further into the environment, thus avoiding even 
greater remediation efforts. 
The negotiated settlement allowed MHD and the Commonwealth 
to save face because they cooperated in implementing and directing 
the clean-up efforts with the federal EPA through the state DEP,n6 
Most importantly, a settlement allowed EPA to effectuate the pur-
poses of the statute by comprehensively addressing the releases of 
hazardous constituents that had taken place years ahead of a litigation 
schedule.117 
C. The Settlement 
The settlement that was reached was touted as "unprecedented in 
the nation's history."118 EPA worked with the Massachusetts DEP so 
that DEP would be involved in much of the oversight of the MHD 
agreement.1l9 The joint state-federal agreement was unparalleled in 
both size and scope, and represented the largest commitment of public 
resources ever to address violations at a state facility under RCRA 
anywhere in the country.120 In the end, MHD requested expenditure 
authorization of between twenty and forty million dollars to further 
investigate and remediate environmental problems at its facilities. 121 
There were provisions for each facility to come into compliance within 
specified time periods, as well as provisions for auditing each facility.l22 
MHD also agreed to spend $5 million in SEPs, mainly for environ-
mental justice programs.123 Finally, MHD paid a $100,000 penalty to 
the federal government for violating hazardous waste laws.124 
115 See EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1-2. 
116 See id. at 2, 5; see also Allen, supra note 2 (the agreement to let the state DEP oversee 
most of the follow-up inspections ... reflected the EPA's faith in the state's commitment to the 
cleanup). 
117 See generally MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5. 
118 EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1. 
119 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
120 See EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1. 
121 See id. 
122 See generally MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5. 
123 See EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1. 
124 See id. 
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In order to better prepare itself if negotiations stalled, EPA worked 
on both the settlement agreement and a complaint simultaneously.125 
The complaint was filed pursuant to section 3008(a) of RCRA, for 
noncompliance and violation of section 3002(c) of RCRA.126 EPA tar-
geted three specific sites: Bridgewater, Wellesley, and South Bos-
ton.127 In doing so, EPA chose to treat MHD as a large-quantity 
generator of hazardous waste under section 6903(5) of RCRA, rather 
than as an interim TSD.128 The allegations in the complaint ranged 
from failure to ensure that all personnel who handled or managed 
waste received training, to failure to conduct annual reviews or main-
tain contingency plans, to storage of waste in excess of ninety days 
and leaking containers.129 EPA assessed a total penalty of $3,989,660 
(payable to the Treasurer, United States of America).130 
Along with the complaint, EPA served and executed the Consent 
Agreement and Order (CAO).l31 The flexibility provided by the con-
sent agreement allowed EPA to go well beyond the scope of what was 
alleged in the complaint.132 Among other things, EPA was able to 
negotiate corrective action measures without having to go through 
the procedural hoops to bring those actual charges.133 
The stated objective of the CAO required MHD to perform the 
following: (1) achieve a state of compliance with the notification and 
reporting requirements that formed the basis of the complaint; (2) 
implement EPA-approved SEPs as generally set out in the CAO; (3) 
pay a civil penalty in the amount of $100,000; (4) correct any operating 
procedures or conditions at its facilities that violate or may violate 
RCRA and applicable regulations; and (5) correct procedures and/or 
conditions at its facilities that may pose a threat to human health and 
the environment. 134 
125 See Brown Interview 12/3/97, 8upa note 84; see generally MHD Complaint, supa note 84; 
MHD Consent Agreement, supa note 5 (particularly filing dates). 
125 See MHD Complaint, supa note 84, at 1. 
127 See id. at 4. 
128 See id. at 5. 
129 See id. at 6-9. 
130 [d. at 19. 
131 See MHD Consent Agreement, supa note 5. 
132 Compare MHD Complaint, Bupa note 84 with MHD Consent Agreement, Bupa note 5 
(only baseline violations alleged, but corrective action measures agreed to in Consent Agree-
ment, among other remedial provisions such as SEPs). 
133 See id. 
134 See MHD Consent Agreement, 8upa note 5, at 3-4. 
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Furthermore, EPA gave the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
through the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs and DEP, 
large measures of responsibility to administer portions of the settle-
ment, including a unique role in ensuring and reviewing the perform-
ance of multi-media audits at each MHD facility.135 DEP received 
responsibility to take timely and appropriate enforcement actions to 
address any violations uncovered by the audits.136 While EPA would 
defer to DEP's lead role in taking appropriate measures, EPA and 
DEP would have dual enforcement authority.137 
DEP was charged with directing and monitoring an agency-wide 
audit of all MHD facilities that generated, stored, disposed of, or 
transported waste; thoroughly evaluating the nature and extent of 
any releases or threatened releases of hazardous wastes or hazardous 
constituents at or from the facilities; implementing stabilization/in-
terim measures to control or abate imminent threats to human health 
or the environment from releases and threatened releases of hazard-
ous waste or hazardous constituents at or from the facilities; prevent-
ing or minimizing the further spread of contamination while pursuing 
long-term corrective action remedies at the facilities; and implement-
ing waste minimization strategies.13S 
DEP's role was included pursuant to the Clean State Initiative 
enacted by then Governor William Weld (Executive Order 350) on 
March 19, 1994, which required Massachusetts state agencies to iden-
tify, report, and correct all environmental problems in a comprehen-
sive manner.139 Agencies would achieve these goals by identifying, 
investigating, and facilitating the resolution of existing compliance 
matters.140 In so doing, the Commonwealth would address future en-
vironmental problems by investigating, planning, and proposing the 
implementation of preventative environmental measures for each of 
the executive offices and their agencies.l4l 
Incorporating the DEP and the Clean State Initiative into the CAO 
formally charged the state with responsibility for enforcing the agree-
ment, but also allowed the Commonwealth to save face within the 
135 See Letter from Harley Laing, EPA Regional Counsel to Edward J. Corcoran II, MHD 
Chief Counsel (Sept. 30, 1994). 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 MHD Consent Agreement, supra note 5, at 4. 
139 See id. at 2. 
140 See id. at 4. 
141 See id. 
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community by allowing it to appear to be taking the initiative in 
environmental protection.142 Additionally, this entire process was ex-
pedited by assigning both the enforcement and implementation costs 
to a third party, because EPA would not otherwise have had the 
resources to implement and enforce the CAO on its own.143 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SEPs 
While MHD's twenty million dollar commitment to perform reme-
diation at its sites was the largest commitment ever made by a state 
to address RCRA violations at state facilities, the five million dollar 
commitment to supplemental environmental projects was an even 
more significant record-setting achievement.144 The SEP provisions 
were significant because they provided the agency with the discretion 
to go beyond the traditional boundaries of statutory enforcement to 
truly effectuate the purposes of the statute: prevention and remedia-
tion of environmental pollution.145 In order to fully explore the sig-
nificance of these SEPs, some background of their use and develop-
ment is necessary. 
EPA has employed SEPs in various forms and under various names 
since the late 1970s and early 1980s.146 SEPs developed as "alternative 
payments" in the form of projects or activities within the substantive 
settlement conditions of consent orders and decrees.147 They were to 
be distinguished from other projects that were part of injunctive 
relief requirements to merely correct violations or obtain compliance 
at a site.148 Defendants agreed to perform SEPs in exchange for a 
reduction in the amount of an assessed civil penalty.149 EPA had pre-
liminary guidance on such programs as early as 1984, but did not have 
142 See Allen, supra note 2; EPA ENVTL. NEWS, at 1-2, 4. 
143 See Brown Interview 218/98, supra note 63. 
144 See EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1. 
145 See discussion infra notes 151-55 and accompanying text. 
146 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 1993); see also 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 
10174 (Apr. 1996). 
147 See EPA Memorandum Letter, Policy on the Use of Supplemental Enforcement Projects 
in EPA Settlements, Feb. 12, 1991 [hereinafter EPA 1991 SEP Policy Letter] (the letter 
precedes the actual Policy Statement). SEPs were also referred to as "mitigation projects" or 
"environmentally beneficial expenditures." See id. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
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a more formal policy on SEPs as such until 1991,150 Hence, SEPs were 
used sparingly until the 1990s.151 
A. The 1991 EPA SEP Policy Guideline 
The 1991 SEP Policy guideline (1991 Policy) stated the agency's 
belief that the use of supplemental projects, if carefully crafted and 
executed, could provide useful environmental benefits "beyond what 
can be secured solely through injunctive relief," and could be particu-
larly useful in promoting pollution prevention.152 
The 1991 Policy's introduction explained that SEPs aimed to 
achieve more than mere compliance from a defendant after a viola-
tion.153 EPA has always insisted that a defendant come into compliance 
with federal environmental laws and regulations as part of a settle-
ment because it could otherwise achieve this result as part of adjudi-
cated injunctive relief.154 In this case, the agency desired to employ 
additional relief beyond what was normally available in the form of 
projects that would both mitigate and remediate the adverse public 
health or environmental consequence from the violation in question.155 
EPA will only approve a SEP if the project furthers the agency's 
statutory mandate to clean up the environment and deter violations 
of law.156 Hence, EPA established three criteria that defendants must 
meet before it will even consider a SEP proposal: (1) violations must 
be corrected through actions to ensure future compliance; (2) deter-
rence objectives are served by payment of a substantial monetary 
penalty;157 and (3) there is an appropriate "nexus" or relationship 
between the nature of the violation and the environmental benefits to 
150 See id. (citing GM-22, A Framework for Statute-Specific Approaches to Penalty Assess-
ments: Implementing EPA's Policy on Civil Penalties, Alternative Payments section, at 24-27, 
issued 2116/84); EPA 1991 SEP Policy Letter. The 1991 Policy replaced and superseded the 
Alternative Payments section of the 1984 document. See id. 
151 See 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 (Apr. 1996). 
152 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy Letter, supra note 147, at 2 (emphasis added). 
153 See EPA Memorandum, Policy on the Use of Supplemental Enforcement Projects in EPA 
Settlements, Feb. 12, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter EPA 1991 SEP Policy]. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See id. at 1-2. 
157 See id. at 1. The SEP Policy states that EPA penalty policies still require the assessment 
of a substantial monetary penalty ... generally at a level that captures the defendant's economic 
benefit of noncompliance plus some appreciable portion of the gravity component of the penalty. 
See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, at 1. 
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be derived from the supplemental project. l5S Furthermore, all projects 
must improve the injured environment or reduce the total risk burden 
posed to public health or the environment by the identified viola-
tions.l59 
Because the 1984 Alternative Payments policy offered little guid-
ance on the nature of projects that would be acceptable to EPA, the 
agency had problems administering the program. l60 The 1991 Policy 
Guidelines attempted to address these prior concerns by establishing 
five categories that would be permissible for supplemental activities; 
proposals that did not fall within one of these categories would not be 
approved.l6l The five categories of permissible SEPs established un-
der the 1991 Policy were pollution prevention, pollution reduction, 
environmental restoration, environmental auditing projects, and pub-
lic awareness projects that are directly related to addressing compli-
ance within the industry in which the violation took place.l62 
Projects that EPA specifically mentioned as impermissible included 
general educational or environmental awareness-raising projects;l63 
contributions to research at colleges or universities concerning the 
environmental area of noncompliance or concerning any other area of 
environmental study; and projects unrelated to the enforcement ac-
tion, but otherwise beneficiaP64 to the community.l65 
While the five categories of permissible SEPs created a great deal 
of flexibility for creative proposals and agency discretion, proposed 
SEPs still needed to meet a nexus requirement. l66 To satisfy the nexus 
requirement, EPA required that an appropriate relationship exist 
between the nature of the violation and the environmental benefits to 
be derived from the type of supplemental environmental project.167 
For pollution prevention, pollution reduction, restoration, and audit 
158 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 1. 
159 See id. at 2. 
160 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy Letter, supra note 147. 
161 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 2-4. 
162ld. 
163 See id. at 4-5. Specific examples include sponsoring public seminars about, or inviting 
schools to tour the environmental controls at a facility, or promoting recycling in a community. 
See id. at 5. 
164 Such as contributing to charities. See id. at 5. 
165 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 5. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. For example, the nexus between a violation and an environmental restoration 
project would exist when the project remediated injuries caused by the same pollutant at the 
same facility giving rise to the violation. See id. 
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projects, EPA further broke down the nexus requirement to either a 
"vertical" or "horizontal" nexus. l68 
EPA considered a "vertical" nexus to exist when the supplemental 
project operated to reduce pollutant loadings in a given environ-
mental medium to offset earlier excess loadings of the same pollutant 
in the same medium created by the violation in question.169 Such 
projects might trace a violation back into the manufacturing process 
to address the root cause of the pollution, and reductions would be 
obtained from the source responsible for the violation or, in some 
cases, from another source that was upstream from the immediately 
responsible source.170 
A "horizontal" nexus, on the other hand, would exist when the 
supplemental project involved either relief for different media at a 
given facility, or relief for the same media at different facilities.l7l 
Because the relationship between the project and the violation in 
question could be more attenuated under a "horizontal" nexus, such 
proposals were subject to careful scrutiny.172 A nexus would be met 
only if the supplemental project reduced the overall public health or 
environmental risk posed by the facility responsible for the violation, 
or enhanced the prospects for reducing or eliminating the likelihood 
of future violations substantially similar to those that were the basis 
for the enforcement action.173 
An example of an acceptable "horizontal" nexus within the 1991 
SEP Policy involving RCRA would be a supplemental project to 
reduce toxic air emissions from a facility that had been found in 
violation of the federal regulation for contaminating drinking water 
in a neighborhood.174 The reduction of emissions of a different medium, 
in addition to correcting the violation in question, would be necessary 
168 See id. at 6. 
169 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 6. 
170 See id. The example given within the policy statement for a "vertical" nexus involves the 
Clean Water Act. If pollutants were discharged from a facility at a certain point along a river, 
an acceptable pollution reduction project would be to reduce discharges of that same pollutant 
at an upstream facility on the same river. Another example would be to alter a production 
process at a facility which handles a portion of the manufacturing process antecedent to that 
which caused the violation of the regulatory requirement in a way that yields reductions or total 
elimination of the residual pollutant discharges to the environmental media affected by the 
violation. See id. 
171 See id. at 7. 
172 See id. 
173 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 7. 
174 See id. 
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to compensate for the increased health risk that neighborhood resi-
dents were subjected to because of the original RCRA violation.175 
Another example of a "horizontal" nexus would be the reduction of 
discharges at another facility of the defendant within the same wa-
tershed or air quality basin as the facility where the violation in 
question had occurred.176 This would reduce the overall health or 
environmental risk posed by related operations to the environment 
or to the health of the residents in the same geographic vicinity by 
reducing the overall pollutant discharges within that community and 
thus compensate for past excess discharges and increased risks.177 
Once a proposed SEP met both the category requirement and the 
nexus requirement, it would still need to meet further criteria before 
approval by EPA.178 Because a defendant could propose to undertake 
a SEP at any time prior to resolution of the enforcement action, EPA 
had to consider the status of the litigation or administrative action 
and the amount of resources that had been committed to that action 
before accepting a proposal.179 Furthermore, EPA would evaluate the 
defendant's enforcement history and technical and financial resources 
in order to determine the likelihood of the defendant completing the 
project.180 EPA gave greater deference to first-time violators than 
repeat offenders.181 
EPA also carefully scrutinized who was the main beneficiary of the 
project.1B2 The 1991 Policy Guidelines made clear that the sole interest 
of the federal government in considering SEPs was to ameliorate the 
adverse public health and/or environmental impacts of violations.183 
Therefore, projects were not intended to reward defendants for un-
dertaking projects that are clearly in the defendant's economic self-
interest, such as modernizing facilities to become more competitive.184 
175 See id. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
178 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 8. 
179 See id. at 8-9. 
l!ll See id. at 9. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
1&'1 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 9. 
184 See id. However, for an in depth discussion of how environmental technology can be 
employed as an incentive for businesses to increase environmental compliance, decrease pollut-
ant discharges, and increase efficiency and competitiveness, see generally, CURTIS MOORE & 
ALAN MILLER, GREEN GOLD: JAPAN, GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RACE FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY (1994). 
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Thus, EPA developed a general rule against approving projects rep-
resenting "sound business practices," such as capital expenditures or 
management improvements where the defendant receives the sub-
stantial share of benefits rather than the public.l85 The only exception 
to this rule would be where a project is both a sound business practice 
and a pollution prevention project because of the potential long-term 
health and environmental benefits to the public.186 However, under 
such an analysis, the public benefits must be substantial in serving 
the public interest. 187 
Finally, although SEPs fulfill EPA's goal of protecting and restoring 
the environment, the agency desired that penalties, as an important 
countervailing enforcement goal, have the strongest possible deter-
rent effect upon the regulated community.1ss Thus, the agency would 
not lower a penalty amount by more than the after-tax amount the 
violator had spent on the project.189 EPA's penalty policy criteria 
attempt to assess a civil penalty based on the defendant's economic 
benefit from noncompliance, plus a component based on the gravity 
of the violation. l90 If a SEP is approved, EPA would calculate the net 
present after-tax value of the supplemental project, and the gravity 
component of the penalty would be mitigated by the after-tax cost of 
the project, depending on the level of environmental benefits to the 
public. 191 
B. Acceptance of SE Ps 
The use of SEPs greatly increased and policy implementation con-
tinued to develop after the issuance of the 1991 Policy Guidelines.192 
By 1993, between five and ten percent of all EPA settlements em-
ployed SEPs.193 EPA expected and encouraged continued develop-
ment and expansion of the SEP program.194 The SEP program was 
185 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 9. 
1!l6 See id. 
187 See id. 
188 See id. at 9-10. 
189 See id. at 10. 
190 See EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153, at 10. 
191 See id. 
192 See, e.g., 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 282 (June 10, 1994); 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 
1993). 
193 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 1993). Approximately one in ten cases employed 
the use of an SEP. See id. 
194 See id. 
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encouraging to EPA because it spurred settlements, rather than liti-
gation. The result was a conservation of EPA resources, with a pollu-
tion prevention focus, rather than merely addressing compliance is-
sues.195 EPA approved approximately 400 SEPs in 1992, with the 
great majority of them focusing on pollution prevention from viola-
tions of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) and the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA).196 EPA also 
approved SEPs under other federal statutes such as the Clean Air 
Act, Clean Water Act, and RCRA.197 
One result from the expansion of the SEP program after the 1991 
Policy was the unusual alliance that formed in support of the pro-
gram.198 EPA strongly supported the SEP program not only because 
of the improvements in pollution prevention, but also because of the 
expediency of its responses to violations. Industry and corporate 
defendants were relieved to see fines reduced, and local community 
groups were able to put teeth into citizen suits, as their communities 
directly benefited from pollution prevention and remediation pro-
jects.199 EPA essentially gained support from groups that otherwise 
might not have backed proposals to reduce penalties.20o 
However, not everyone supported the newly energized SEP pro-
gram.201 Representative John Dingell (D-Mich.), then chairman of the 
House Energy and Commerce Committee, challenged EPA's author-
ity to enter into SEPs.202 In December of 1991, he called for the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) to study whether EPA had legal 
authority to enter into SEPs when settling mobile source emissions 
violations under the Clean Air Act.203 In July of 1992, GAO concluded 
in its report that EPA did not have that authority.204 In so concluding, 
195 See id. 
196 See id.; 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3201 (Apr. 23, 1993); Thxic Substance Control Act (TSCA), 
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1994); Emergency Planning and Community Right-Th-Know Act (EP-
CRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994). Initial figures for the first half of 1992 showed 164 SEPs 
were negotiated worth approximately $23 million. See id. 
197 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 1993). 
198 See id. 
199 See id. 
200 See id. 
201 See, e.g., 23 Env't Rep. (BN A) 3201 (Apr. 23, 1993); 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 
(Apr. 1996). 
202 See, e.g., 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3201 (Apr. 23,1993); 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 
(Apr. 1996). 
203 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 1993); 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 
(Apr. 1996). 
204 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 1993); 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 
(Apr. 1996). 
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GAO took exception to EPA's approval of SEPs for mobile emissions 
violations that allowed defendants to fund public awareness cam-
paigns.205 GAO further found that the receiver of the penalty payment 
frequently had no relationship to the violation and had suffered no 
injury justifying payment.206 
While EPA interpreted this study as only applying to mobile source 
emissions under the Clean Air Act, the report did raise concerns that 
the SEP program might be in jeopardy.207 The GAO study further 
concluded that EPA's SEP program violated the Miscellaneous Re-
ceipts Act (MRA).208 The MRA requires that money received by gov-
ernment officials and agencies on behalf of the government be depos-
ited into the U.S. Treasury.209 Finally, GAO claimed that EPA was 
circumventing the congressional appropriations process, because it 
could carry out agency goals beyond addressing the particular viola-
tion in question.210 
EPA responded to Representative Dingell and GAO in December, 
1992 with a letter that reiterated its belief that it had legal authority 
to continue the SEP program, although it had revised the mobile 
emissions programs to address some of GAO's concerns.211 Repre-
sentative Dingell requested a follow-up decision from GAO in which 
he challenged EPA's authority to enter into SEPs under any statute.212 
GAO responded in March, 1993 with a letter that reaffirmed its July, 
1992 opinion, but EPA did not issue a formal response to this letter.213 
Representative Dingell also wrote to newly-appointed EPA Admin-
istrator Carol Browner in March, 1993, urging her to reverse former 
Administrator William Reilly's policy on SEPs.214 
However, Browner's previous emphasis on nontraditional enforce-
ment measures that encouraged pollution prevention, environmental 
restoration, and public education indicated she would continue to 
support and develop the SEP program.215 In later face-to-face meet-
205 See 23 Env't Rep. (BN A) 3201 (Apr. 23, 1993). Violators funded public relations firms to 
mount campaigns regarding automobile pollution control equipment. See id. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See 31 U.S.C. § 3302; 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 (Apr. 1996). 
209 See 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). 
210 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3201 (Apr. 23, 1993); 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 
(Apr. 1996). 
211 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 1993). 
212 See 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 (Apr. 1996). 
213 See id. 
214 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3201 (Apr. 23, 1993). 
215 See 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2692 (Feb. 12, 1993). 
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ings with Representative Dingell's staff, GAO, and EPA, the three 
groups agreed that GAO opinions did not apply to all SEPs, although 
the public awareness issue remained more uncertain.216 
While Browner continued to place greater emphasis on the SEP 
program and multi-media enforcement over the next year, the nexus 
issue raised by Representative Dingell and GAO would continue to 
be a focus of those concerned by the expansion of SEPS.217 Further 
concerns were raised by the tax implications to corporations and 
businesses that performed SEPS.218 Unlike penalties, some critics 
feared SEP expenditures could theoretically be deducted as business 
expenses.219 
IV. PROGRESS & ApPLICATION-THE SEP PROGRAM GROWS 
A. The MHD SEPs 
Against this political backdrop of both growing support and con-
cerns being raised about SEPs under EPA's 1991 Policy, Region I 
forged ahead with the largest dollar commitment to SEPs ever under 
a RCRA enforcement.22o Not only was the dollar amount significant, 
as it was the largest public appropriation of resources for SEPs ever, 
but the projects themselves were significant because they greatly 
expanded the scope of SEPs by targeting environmental justice221 and 
community-based emergency planning and preparation.222 This would 
later be reflected in both the Interim Revised EPA SEP Policy re-
leased in May, 1995 and the 1998 Final Policy Guideline.223 
EPA approved six individual SEPs proposed by MHD.224 Under the 
first project, generally entitled "government training," MHD devel-
oped an environmental education program for the highway and public 
216 See 26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10174 (Apr. 1996). 
217 See 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2062 (Mar. 4,1994). 
218 See id. 
219 See id.; but see EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 153 (addressing penalty mitigation by 
SEPs with after tax figures). 
220 See EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1. 
221 Environmental Justice addresses the disproportionately high and adverse human health 
or environmental impacts on minority and low-income populations. See Exec. Order No. 12898, 
30 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 276 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
222 See EPA ENVTL. NEWS, supra note 7, at 1; compare EPA 1991 SEP Policy supra note 153, 
with MHD Proposed SEPs as outlined infra this section. 
223 See generally Interim Revised EPA SEP Policy, May 8, 1995 [hereinafter EPA 1995 SEP 
Policy]; EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 24796, 24796 (1998) 
[hereinafter EPA 1998 SEP Policy]. 
224 See infra notes 225-54 and accompanying text. 
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works departments of the state's 351 cities and towns.225 The program 
was designed to inform such departments of environmental regula-
tory requirements governing state and municipal maintenance facili-
ties.226 Programs included workshops on subjects such as under-
ground storage of petroleum projects, hazardous waste regulations, 
right-to-know laws, and releases of oil and other hazardous materi-
als.227 The stated objective was to increase environmentally sound 
practices within the state and reduce incidents of noncompliance with 
environmental laws and regulations.228 The program was also de-
signed to directly benefit all of the state's EPA-designated Environ-
mental Justice Areas.229 
A more significant community-based project was the donation of 
CAMEO software and training, and in some cases computers, to over 
eighty designated Massachusetts Priority Planning Areas.230 
CAMEO, or Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Opera-
tions, is a program designed to aid communities in response strategies 
and risk management procedures for hazardous substance releases.231 
This software allows communities to compile database lists of hazard-
ous waste generators in their respective areas, track what types of 
hazardous substances are generated or stored at the sites, and create 
emergency planning to respond to releases or exposures in order to 
mitigate damages.232 CAMEO software uses mapping features that 
can incorporate census data to predict how releases could affect ar-
eas.233 
A third project involved an expenditure of $750,000 to assess and 
remediate two sites in Holyoke.234 This project was in conjunction with 
226 See In the Matter of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, MHD, Docket No: RCRA-I-
94-1071, Proposed Supplemental Environmental Projects, January 3, 1995 [hereinafter MHD 
SEP 113195]. 
226 See id. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 See MHD SEP 113195, supra note 225. 
231 See 18 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1791 (Mar. 17, 1995). CAMEO was developed by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), EPA, and the National Safety 
Council to aid response organizations in responding to hazardous substance releases. See 20 
Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA), 227 (May 10, 1996). 
232 See MHD SEP 113195, supra note 225. 
233 See id. CAMEO systems are frequently located at community fire departments where the 
emergency response teams are located. See 13 Chern. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1428 (Feb. 9, 1990). 
234 See In the Matter of The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, MHD, Docket No: RCRA-I-
94-1071, Proposed Supplemental Environmental Projects, May 1, 1995 [hereinafter MHD SEP 
511195]. 
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a multi-site cooperative agreement between EPA and DEP-the Ho-
lyoke Initiative.235 The Holyoke Initiative was one of four site-assess-
ment environmental justice projects scheduled nationwide by EPA's 
Hazardous Site Evaluation Division.236 The City of Holyoke has both 
a high proportion of minority and low-income residents, and over 
forty sites with oil and/or hazardous material contamination.237 
MHD specifically targeted two sites as part of the Holyoke SEP.238 
One of the sites involved petroleum contaminated soil, while the other 
involved a release of fuel and waste oil in both a surface contamination 
and sub-surface plume.239 Additionally, MHD owned several facilities 
in the area that were also being remediated as part of MHD's compli-
ance efforts.240 These projects would reduce the risk to public health 
and the environment by remediating contaminated properties for 
redevelopment and creation of a greenspace for residential use.241 The 
remediation effort would remove petroleum and other hazardous con-
taminants from the soil and groundwater, thereby abating the exist-
ing hazardous condition and preventing further migration of existing 
contaminants.242 
A similar innovative project involved site assessment and remedia-
tion of multiple parcels along the Neponset River watershed, which 
runs through several environmental justice neighborhoods including 
Dorchester, Hyde Park, and Mattapan.243 This project was created 
pursuant to an agreement with the Trust for Public Land (TPL),244 
whereby MHD would aid TPL in acquiring the contaminated parcels 
along the river, remediating, and ultimately conveying the properties 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See id. Fifty-four percent of the residents in the area targeted by the Holyoke Initiative 
and MHD SEP earned incomes below the poverty level. See id. 
238 See MHD SEP 5/1/95, supra note 234, at 1. 
239 See id. 
240 See id. 
241 See id. 
242 See id. 
243 See In the Matter of' The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, MHD, Docket No: RCRA-I-
94-1071, Proposal for the Expenditure of Funds to Assess and Remediate Contaminated Land 
Along the Neponset River Acquired by the Trust for Public Land and Transferred to the 
Metropolitan District Commission as Part of the Neponset River Greenway Initiative (Dec. 17, 
1996) [hereinafter MHD Neponset River Proposal]. 
244 TPL is an over 20 year old national nonprofit land conservation organization, based in San 
Francisco, with regional offices throughout the country. They work with local governments, 
state and federal agencies, and other nonprofit groups to facilitate the transfer of significant 
private lands into public ownership. See id. at 1. 
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to the Metropolitan District Commission to provide for public open 
space.245 This project was part of a larger initiative, the Neponset 
River Greenway Initiative, which involved several local citizens 
groups, state funds and commissions, and national nonprofit groups 
to build public awareness about, and access to, the Neponset River.246 
The SEP would improve water quality, plant and wildlife habitat, and 
provide recreational opportunities and river access to the environ-
mental justice communities.247 
A similar open space recreational development project was ap-
proved in another inner-city suburb of Boston.248 In coalition with the 
Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (DSNI)249, a nonprofit commu-
nity public interest group, MHD would remediate land and build a 
four season greenhouse in the Dudley Street area of Roxbury.250 This 
type of SEP was particularly innovative because the community was 
involved in developing the SEP through the MHD's coalition with the 
local community organizations.251 Unlike previous SEPs that may 
have had after-the-fact benefits for a community once the defendant 
made improvements to its own site, in these cases the community was 
the primary basis of the remedial effort, with benefits flowing directly 
to the community affected by the defendant.252 
EPA approved another similar community-based remediation pro-
ject in the city of Lawrence, where MHD would work in coalition with 
the City, EPA, and DEP to assess, cap, and convert a former incin-
erator site and adjacent incinerator residue landfill into a multi-use 
245 See id. Several of the proposed parcels were inactive commercial and industrial properties. 
See id. at 2. 
246 See id. at 1. 
247 See MHD Neponset River Proposal, supra note 243, at 1. 
248 See In the Matter of' The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, MHD, Docket No: RCRA-I-
94--1071, Proposal for the Expenditure of Funds to Assess and Remediate Contaminated Land 
in the Dudley Street Neighborhood and to Design and Construct a Four Season Community 
Greenhouse in Coordination with the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative (May 20, 1997), at 
1 [hereinafter MHD Dudley Street ProposalJ. 
249 DSNI, a collaborative group of over 2,000 residents, social service agencies, businesses, 
and religious institutions, was the first grassroots community organization in the country to 
gain eminent domain authority in order to transform vacant lots into either green spaces or 
parcels capable of redevelopment. See id. 
250 See id. The Dudley Street neighborhood is one of the poorest in Massachusetts, with a per 
capita income of less than $9,000. It contains 54 state-listed hazardous waste sites, which equals 
nine percent of Boston's waste sites in an area that houses just four percent of the population. 
See id. 
251 See id. at 2. 
252 See MHD Dudley Street Proposal, supra note 248, at 2. 
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recreational area along the Merrimack River.253 This SEP would ac-
complish multiple environmental goals such as preventing further 
pollution of the Merrimack by remediating the former landfill, reduc-
ing risks to human health, and creating natural open-space recrea-
tional opportunities to an economically disadvantaged, diverse, urban 
population.254 
These SEPs pushed the boundaries of the nexus requirements as 
defined by the 1991 EPA SEP Policy.255 Given the controversy sur-
rounding SEPs and particularly the nexus requirement, such EPA 
efforts could have threatened the viability of settlement negotia-
tions.256 However, at the same time, the MHD SEPs were comporting 
with a shift in the federal government that recognized the need for 
emphasis on environmental justice and creative solutions to environ-
mental problems.257 
In February, 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 
12898-Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minor-
ity Populations and Low-Income Populations.258 This order greatly 
bolstered EPA's latitude in formulating SEPs because it specifically 
directed federal agencies to integrate environmental justice issues 
into agency policy.259 By incorporating environmental justice and com-
munity-based remediation projects, the MHD SEPs were able to 
achieve these goals prior to EPA's formal incorporation of E.O. 12898 
into its Revised SEP Policy.260 The innovative aspects of the MHD 
SEPs can thus be highlighted through the changes that were incor-
porated into the Interim Revised EPA Supplemental Environmental 
Projects Policy that was released in the spring of 1995 following the 
MHD settlement.261 
B. The 1995 Revised SEP Policy 
Although the 1995 Revised Policy became effective May 8, 1995, 
after some of the MHD SEPs had already been approved, several of 
253 See MHD SEP 1/3/95, supra note 225. 
264 See id. 
255 Compare MHD SEP Proposals supra notes 225-54 with EPA 1991 SEP Policy, supra note 
153. 
256 See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
257 See Exec. Order No. 12898,30 WEEKLY CaMP. PRES. Doc. 276 (Feb. 11, 1994). 
258 See id. 
259 See id. 
260 See generally EPA 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 223. 
261 See id. at 2, 7-8. 
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MHD's proposals were not approved until after that time and were 
thus considered under the new policy.262 The new key language of the 
Revised Policy follows right after the background section and is titled 
"Pollution Prevention and Environmental Justice."263 The Policy ac-
knowledges "the concerns, as expressed in Executive Order 12898 on 
environmental justice, that certain segments of the nation's popula-
tion are disproportionately burdened by pollutant exposure."264 It 
further states that ''because environmental justice is not a specific 
technique or process but an overarching goal, it is not listed as a 
category of SEP; but EPA encourages SEPs in communities where 
environmental justice may be an issue."265 Another notable addition 
was a new category entitled "Emergency Planning and Prepared-
ness" that emphasizes projects similar to the MHD CAMEO pro-
ject.266 
C. The 1998 Final SEP Policy 
On May 1, 1998, EPA released the Final EPA SEP Policy which 
supersedes the 1995 Interim Revised Policy.267 As the introductory 
memorandum indicates, the new policy is "a product of almost three 
years of experience implementing and fine-tuning the 1995 Interim 
Revised SEP Policy."268 The Final Policy basically maintains the same 
structure and operation of the Interim Policy while attempting to 
clarify some of the language and principles.269 EPA has attempted to 
refine and clarify the policy in order to "better assist it in exercising 
its enforcement discretion to establish appropriate settlement penal-
ties and supplemental environmental projects that secure significant 
environmental and public health improvements."27o Thus, the stated 
primary purpose of the policy is still to obtain environmental and 
public health protection and improvements that may not otherwise 
occur without the settlement incentives provided by the policy.271 
262 See id. at 1. 
263 See id. at 2. 
264 ld. 
265 See EPA 1995 SEP Policy, supra note 223, at 2. 
266 See id. at 9. 
267 See EPA 1998 SEP Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24796. 
268 See 29 Env't Rep. (BNA) 77 (May 1, 1998) (citing EPA Memorandum Letter, Issuance of 
Final Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, April 10, 1998). 
269 See id.; EPA 1998 SEP Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24796. 
270 EPA 1998 SEP Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24796. 
271 See id. 
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Some of the significant changes include the creation of an "other" 
category to include otherwise-beneficial projects that do not fit neatly 
into any of the previously allowable categories,272 a more defined pen-
alty calculation methodology,273 and a more clearly defined and revised 
nexus guideline that makes projects easier to implement by making 
the nexus easier to apply.274 
However, one of the most significant additions, in light of the pro-
jects implemented under the MHD settlement, is the addition of a 
new guideline that both encourages and rewards the use of commu-
nity input to develop projects.275 The new policy states that seeking 
input on project proposals from the local community that may have 
been adversely impacted by the violation may better address the 
needs of the impacted community, promote environmental justice, 
produce better community understanding of EPA enforcement, and 
improve relations between the community and the violating facility.276 
While representatives from community groups will not be able to 
participate directly in the settlement negotiations, the potential for 
implementation of community input is at least another step forward 
in attempts to more efficiently and effectively redress adversely im-
pacted communities.277 
CONCLUSION 
Many factors have contributed to the eventual shift that has taken 
place within federal agencies and enforcement groups regarding the 
incorporation of means to achieve environmental justice and the use 
of SEPs to carry out this mission: the success of SEPs in the formative 
years between the 1991 and 1995 Policies,278 The President's Execu-
tive Order 12898,279 a new EPA Administrator who continued to see 
the value in creative solutions to achieve pollution prevention,280 the 
unusual coalition of supporters for the SEP program,281 the continuing 
disparity of hazardous exposures between low and high income com-
272 See id. at 24800-0l. 
273 See id. at 24801-02. 
274 See id. at 24798. 
275 See EPA 1998 SEP Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24803. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
278 See supra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. 
279 See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text. 
2!lO See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text. 
281 See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text. 
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munities,282 the most recent 1998 SEP Policy Guidelines,283 and per-
haps most notably the failure of traditional litigation-based federal 
enforcement measures to either effectively prevent exposures to pol-
lution and hazardous substances or adequately remediate communi-
ties affected by such exposures.284 
Given the flurry of dynamics that began in the 1970s with the 
enactment of RCRA and CERCLA and has come full circle in the 
latter half of the 1990s as we once again rethink the efficacy of these 
statutes, it is easy to lose sight of some of the small but bold steps 
that have been taken to fight environmental degradation.285 The MHD 
settlement and community-based SEPs that the EPA employed may 
not appear so novel since the enactments of the Revised Policy and 
the most recent Final Policy, which specifically endorse such goals as 
environmental justice and community remediation.286 However, they 
were most controversial at the time of their enactment in 1994.287 
Keeping the Department of Justice out of the settlement talks (and 
the majority of the MHD money in Massachusetts and out of the U.S. 
Treasury), as well as the Washington EPA office and the Massachu-
setts Attorney General's office, and then seeking approval for millions 
of dollars of fairly radical SEPs that strained the traditional nexus 
requirements was not all achieved with immediate support as a re-
sounding blow against environmental pollution.288 The Department of 
Justice still has less incentive to support an SEP program because it 
means less money will be going into the U.S. Treasury from enforce-
ment actions.289 
However, as Region I EPA Administrator John De Villars noted, 
"this approach should serve as a model for obtaining environmental 
282 See generally discussion of MHD SEPs, supra Section IV (discussing environmental jus-
tice). 
2S'l See EPA 1998 SEP Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. at 24796. 
284 See supra Section I; notes 104-08 and accompanying text. 
285 See generally 28 Env't Rep. (BNA) S-15 (Jan. 16, 1998) (RCRA reform sought to streamline 
and improve efficiency of corrective action program ... [that] is used reluctantly by industry 
because of what parties from all sides see as cumbersome administrative requirements); 28 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1343 (Nov. 7,1997) (costly and timely RCRA requirements under corrective 
action encourage some owners to abandon sites or leave waste in place rather than face RCRA 
requirements); 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1898 (Feb. 2, 1996) (RCRA reform sought to increase 
efficiency and flexibility). 
286 See supra notes 261-65, 275-77 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. 
2B8 See Brown Interview 218/98, supra note 63. 
289 See infra notes 8-10, 209 and accompanying text. 
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compliance ... all across the country."290 Statutes such as CERCLA 
are too time-consuming and costly to adequately protect the public 
from both short and long-term effects of hazardous exposures. 291 
RCRA's corrective action program was a step in the right direction 
in that EPA can at least force hazardous waste generators to timely 
respond to releases of hazardous constituents.292 But even this federal 
remedy takes time and money, and may not adequately remediate the 
more diffuse off-site results of hazardous releases.293 
Dispute resolution, as evidenced by the MHD settlement, can cut 
down critical periods of time that might otherwise be lost to litigation, 
thus mitigating increased harms from hazardous releases.294 Further-
more, dispute resolution can frequently go beyond the remedies avail-
able through traditional adjudicated enforcement actions.295 The use 
of SEPs can frequently be the best possible means of redressing 
harms to citizens of an affected community.296 SEPs can go beyond 
on-site remediation of a defendant's property and directly provide for 
community remediation and restoration, and furthermore increase 
the safety and health of the community as a whole through preventive 
measures.297 
However, SEPs place a heavy burden on EPA and all parties in-
volved to ensure their appropriate design and use.298 The development 
of statutes such as RCRA evidence a cyclical shift in the appropriate-
ness and amount of discretion that has been afforded to EPA.299 Peri-
ods of inability to appropriately adopt and enforce regulations re-
sulted in Congressional mandates that limited EPA discretion.30o 
Then, as rigid enforcement mechanisms under CERCLA began to 
break down the effectiveness of enforcement actions, greater discre-
290 See Allen, supra note 2. 
291 See supra notes 71-73, 78 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra Section I.C and accompanying notes. 
293 See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text. 
294 See generally Exec. Order No. 12988, Civil Justice Reform, Feb. 5, 1996 (urging resolution 
of federal claims, where feasible, through informal discussions, negotiations, and settlements 
rather than formal court proceedings in order to facilitate just and efficient resolution of civil 
claims). 
295 See supra notes 152, 271 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 152, 271, Section III and accompanying text. 
297 See supra Sections III-IV. 
298 See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 44-46, 54, 70, 82, 106-08 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text. 
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tion was given to EPA to tailor remedies under RCRA corrective 
action measures.301 
Such a dynamic has been developing through EPA's employment of 
SEPs as well. While oversight is critical to ensure the SEP program 
continues to attain breakthrough achievements in creative and effec-
tive settlement agreements, the unique ability of SEPs to respond to 
the individual circumstances of environmental problems must be 
maintained. Thus, while litigation remains an effective tool to apply 
pressure and force action in some cases, dispute resolution and crea-
tive settlements should become the goal in the new generation of 
environmental enforcement.302 The use of SEPs is only one advantage 
to dispute resolution, as SEP provisions could be written into federal 
statutes and become an everyday part of adjudicated relief. Dispute 
resolution also saves time and money.303 All of these qualities, as 
evidenced by the MHD settlement, are the most effective means of 
responding to environmental crises. Apart from outright prevention, 
dispute negotiation and community remediation through creative set-
tlements and SEPs continue to be one of the most effective means of 
preserving and protecting human health and the environment. 
301 See supra notes 53-54, 70, 80-82 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra notes 97-98, 110, 125,290 and accompanying text. 
303 See supra notes 104-09, 294. 
